Ottoman judge who authored Radd al-Muhtar, the most authoritative later work on Hanafi law that is still used today. When Syria was part of the United Arab Republic (1958 Republic ( -1961 , the Syrian mufti position was closed under Gamal Abdel Nasser's policies. When the union came to an end, the position was re-opened and Abu al-Yusr resumed his post. Shortly after the Baʿth coup, however, he was ousted and replaced by an interim mufti. A year later, a committee was formed to vote for a new mufti, and at the last minute the Baʿth put forth their own candidate and stacked the committee in their favor. Their candidate was a young scholar of Kurdish extraction, Shaykh Ahmad Kuftaro (1915 Kuftaro ( -2004 did not have the requisite social capital needed to rise among the ranks of the ʿulamaʾ in that he did not come from the main lines of Damascus' scholarly families (though Kuftaro's father was himself a Naqshbandi Sufi and scholar). Also, Kuftaro's intellectual genealogy did not converge with the scholarly network that dominated the ʿulamaʾ, namely that which centered around Shaykh Badr al-Din al- Hasani (1850 Hasani ( -1935 . As an ethnic Kurd, Kuftaro also disrupted the Arab monopoly on the mufti position. Further, aspects of Baʿth ideology aligned well with Kuftaro's own views of religious revivalism: presenting an Islam in tune with modernity, particularly in its embrace of interfaith dialogue and co-existence in a multireligious nation-state. For all these reasons, he was the perfect candidate for the Baʿth.
Modernization theory seems to describe the fate of the elite class of the ʿulamaʾ rather well but fails when considering the religious field as a whole. Under the Ottomans, the highest positions of religious authority -judgeships, administrators of endowments, preachers in cathedral-mosques, etc. -were the monopoly of a cadre of families, such as Kuzbari, Ghazzi, Shatti, Hamzawi, and Ustuwani. As modern education made its way into Syrian society, these families by and large abandoned the religious vocation and moved into different career paths, such as medicine, business, law, and engineering. As a result, these families have virtually no representation in the ranks of late-20 th century ʿulamaʾ, whereas a century earlier they dominated the religious field. The Baʿth, no doubt, contributed to this shift among the traditional elite by ensuring that these positions were closed to members from those families, as Abu al-Yusr's case demonstrates.
As Pierret argues, the move away from the religious vocation by these families did not weaken the religious field as a whole; rather, this vacuum at the top allowed for newer by the state (a major point of contention) and their graduates could only pursue careers as religious functionaries in mosques. The master-disciple relationship and the study of the didactic canon of Islamic thought were set in an institution that aspired to be modern, with a bureaucracy, formal exams, and degree structure.
Another trajectory of tarbiya from this same time period surrounds the work of Shaykh ʿAbd al- Karim al-Rifaʿi (1901 -1973 . Rifaʿi too was concerned with religious education through the master-disciple relationship, but unlike his peer Farfur, Rifaʿi did not establish a shariʿa institute. Basing himself out of the Zayd ibn Thabit Mosque, Rifaʿi set up numerous learning circles that took the traditional mode of Islamic education in a new direction. Each circle was made up of students of a similar age, background, and education that met weekly to study together under a teacher (Rifaʿi or one of his students). Further, Rifaʿi appealed to the secularly educated students at the state schools and the University of
Damascus by offering classes in the mosque that would help them with their studies, in 7 addition to their religious learning. In this way, each circle was not merely a study-group dedicated to religious sciences, but a peer-group. Additionally, through a series of charitable organizations, Rifaʿi offered opportunities for attendees at his mosque to get involved in the distribution of charity and provide services to less fortunate neighborhoods surrounding Damascus. Rifaʿi was thus not primarily concerned with the reproduction of a single class of specialists but sought to ensure that the emerging professionals that would run society had also formed pious Muslim subjectivities rooted in studying the Islamic sciences. His interest was not to produce more ʿulamaʾ and religious functionaries, rather, it was to ensure that the engineer, lawyer, doctor, and businessman too were people of ʿilm.
The Baʿth inherited one institution that, despite their desire and best efforts, they could not get rid of: the Shariʿa College at the University of Damascus. The Shariʿa College was founded in 1954 and was meant primarily to train legal experts in matters of personal law, the domain of law to which the shariʿa was relegated. One of the chief architects of the college was Mustafa al- Sibaʿi (1915 Sibaʿi ( -1964 , who served as its first dean for four years, was a parliamentarian, and head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. The college added a modernized (though not modernist) dimension to religious learning in Damascus. To make the case against their secular-minded opponents in the University and government, the founders of the college argued that it embodied a modern, anti-imperial, and scientific approach to religion. The emphasis was not on re-creating ʿulamaʾ as custodians of tradition, but rather modern researchers (bāḥith) into Islamic law and thought. Finally, it is worth noting that this educational revival extended to women as well.
The eponymous founder of Syria's religious women's movement, Munirah al-Qubaysi (b.
1933), studied under a number of Damascus' most prominent ʿulamaʾ, including the aforementioned Buti, Rifaʿi, and Kuftaro. Qubaysi focused on teaching women key Islamic disciplines, such as Qurʾanic recitation, prophetic biography, and hadith. Her teaching was consistent with that of the main body of Damascene ʿulamaʾ in that it was apolitical, rooted in cultivating pious Muslim subjectivities through learning. She encouraged her followers to be active members of society, and pursue marriage, higher degrees, and careers, particularly in education. Qubaysi's teaching did not take place in institutes but rather, in people's homes.
Through these various trajectories of Islamic education-modern shariʿa institutes, teaching non-specialists and newly emerging professionals, the Sharia College, and femaleled educational initiatives-Damascene ʿulamaʾ were able to reach newer audiences and traditional manner. Most significantly, the faculty by and large adhered to the same doctrinal teachings. and neglect of the religious field did not deliver on the decline of religious sentiment of which they were so confident a few decades ago. It was not enough to exterminate one 13 element (the Brotherhood), they needed to gain control of the field as a whole. They did so by finding partners among the ʿulamaʾ who were critical of political Islam and "subcontracting" them to manage the religious field.
Through his study of the political practices of those in the religious field, Pierret thinks past a simple dichotomy of quietist versus oppositional practices, often mapped on to the ʿulamaʾ and Islamists respectively. He suggests that we consider the political practices of ʿulamaʾ and Islamists "sectorally," that is to say, to consider how their practices seek to "influence state policies on issues that are seen as crucial from the point of view of a particular sectoral elite" (163). For the Islamists, the priority is changing the political system structurally: "Their aim is to modify the central principles of the monopoly on legitimate violence, changing those controlling this monopoly, the rules governing to whom the power may be devolved, and the general limits of its application" (164). While these are the primary interests of Islamists, they are of little concern for the ʿulamaʾ in their daily practices. The sectoral concerns of the ʿulamaʾ center on "the management of the goods of salvation,"
focusing on "the expansion of religious institutions, the preservation of orthodoxy against 'deviant' ideas, and public morality (which they invariably assimilate to female modesty)" Buti used his position to secure the freeing of thousands of political prisoners, and the opening of the religious field significantly in the later years of the 1980's. He also became the most important "media-shaykhs" of this time, appearing on state-run radio, television, and increasingly in print. Buti's ties to Asad were seen as breaking ranks with the main body of Damascus' ʿulamaʾ. Though they begrudgingly kissed the ring when they were required to and were ready to act "as if" the cult of Asad was true, they never quite sided with the state. 
